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	The	Gift	and	Pay-What-You-Want	Pricing	
Henrik	Egbert	 							
Abstract	This	paper	addresses	the	participative	pricing	mechanism	of	Pay-What-You-Want	pricing	as	related	to	Marcel	Mauss’s	concept	of	the	Gift.	Reciprocity	is	a	behavioural	pattern	imminent	to	the	Gift	as	well	as	to	Pay-What-You-Want	pricing.	The	paper	refers	to	results	from	behavioural	economics	in	order	to	identify	factors	that	positively	influence	reciprocity.	It	is	argued	that	the	aspects	elaborated	on	in	the	Gift	are	also	relevant	to	the	PWYW	pricing	mechanism	when	it	comes	to	implementations	of	the	latter	as	one	of	the	corporate	pricing	strategies.		
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Introduction	Economic	theories	allow	predicting	decisions.		In	some	cases	these	theories	work	well,	while	they	fail	in	others.	The	neoclassical	theory	can	serve	as	an	example.	Despite	its	radical	assumptions,	this	theory	can	be	used	to	predict	the	behaviour	of	a	considerable	number	of	individuals	(not	all,	though)	well	(cf.	Carrier	2014	and	the	comment	by	Egbert	2015).	In	other	situations	the	same	theory	can	hardly	be	applied	in	order	to	predict	or	explain	choices.	A	similar	statement	can	be	made	for	other	
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economic	theories.	The	problem	can	be	elucidated	by	the	example	of	participative	pricing.	Recently	some	companies	have	started	selling	products	via	Pay-What-You-Want	(PWYW)	pricing.	This	pricing	scheme	is	an	alternative	to	fixed	or	posted	prices,	auctions	or	price	bargaining.	PWYW	pricing	allows	the	buyer	to	determine	the	price	of	the	purchased	product.	The	seller	has	to	accept	the	price	that	the	buyer	determines.	Neoclassical	theory	assumes	rational	and	egoistic	individuals	and	predicts	that	in	a	one-shot	anonymous	interaction	a	utility	maximizing	buyer	pays	no	more	than	the	minimum	price.	However,	in	applied	PWYW	situations	this	is	not	always	the	case.	Empirical	evidence	shows	that	many	buyers	often	pay	more	than	the	minimum	price.	These	findings	are	in	line	with	theories	of	other	regarding	preferences.	Furthermore,	even	if	buyers	pay	more	than	a	minimum	price,	this	pricing	mechanism	is	bound	to	fail	if	payments	are	too	low	to	cover	the	production	costs.	In	this	case	the	application	of	PWYW	pricing	can	have	negative	effects	on	a	corporate	profit	even	if	people	do	not	behave	selfishly.		PWYW	pricing	provides	buyers	with	the	opportunity	to	pay	sellers	the	price	of	their	choice.	This	payment	can	be	seen	as	a	reciprocation	for	a	good	that	has	been	sold	to	them.	The	problem	for	a	private	company	can	be	described	as	follows:	While	it	is	known	that	many	customers	have	other	regarding	preferences,	reciprocity	being	among	them,	how	can	these	preferences	be	made	fruitful	for	a	profit-oriented	company	if	PWYW	pricing	is	applied	(see	also	Reisman	2016)?	I	argue	in	this	paper	that	the	concept	of	the	Gift,	as	developed	by	Marcel	Mauss	about	100	years	ago,	provides	guidance	in	order	to	make	PWYW	pricing	a	success	for	a	company.	The	Gift	has	not	been	addressed	in	the	rapidly	growing	number	of	studies	on	PWYW	pricing	recently,	and	this	short	paper	closes	this	gap.	The	next	section	provides	a	brief	introduction	to	PWYW	pricing.	After	that	the	concept	of	the	Gift	is	addressed	and	its	peculiarities	with	respect	to	the	discussions	on	reciprocity	and	gift-giving	in	economics	are	shown.	Hence,	the	trust	game	is	used	as	an	illustration.	In	the	final	section	aspects	that	can	be	derived	from	the	Gift	in	order	to	utilize	PWYW	pricing	in	a	business	context	are	pointed	out.		
Pay-What-You-Want	Pricing	PWYW	is	participative	pricing	in	which	a	buyer	can	choose	the	price	of	a	product.	In	particular	cases	the	seller	sets	a	positive	minimum	price	but,	mostly,	buyers	are	free	to	pay	any	price	including	zero.	The	seminal	paper	of	Kim,	Natter	and	Spann	(2009)	initiated	research	on	PWYW	pricing.	Related	papers	mushroomed	in	the	last	few	years	(for	surveys	see	Gerpott	2017;	Greiff	and	Egbert	2016a;	Krzyżanowska	and	Tkaczyk	2016).	Empirical	research	on	the	topic	includes	laboratory	experiments,	
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field	experiments,	survey	experiments	and	case	studies.	Factors	that	have	been	identified	to	influence	the	prices	paid	are:	preferences	(e.g.,	social	preferences	like	fairness,	inequity	aversion,	or	reciprocity),	information	(e.g.,	about	sellers,	buyers,	and	payments,	about	reference	prices	and	costs),	social	interaction	(e.g.,	communication),	individual	characteristics	(income,	age,	gender),	emotions	(feeling	of	guilt),	contextual	factors	(social	distance,	market	structure,	customer	satisfaction).	The	numerous	studies	address	a	large	variety	of	products	and	often	services.	Results	from	recent	research	allow	the	conclusion	that	in	business	practice	PWYW	pricing	is	used	almost	exclusively	for	low-cost	goods	and	experience	goods.	Furthermore,	nearly	all	empirical	studies	report	the	application	for	relatively	short-time	periods	(as	an	exception	see	Riener	and	Traxler	2012).	Moreover,	most	of	the	business	studies	do	not	report	failure	of	the	mechanisms	(as	exceptions	see	León,	Noguera	and	Tena-Sánchez	2012;	Park,	Nam	and	Lee	2016).	One	can	expect	a	bias	in	the	documented	case	studies	because	a	company	is	unlikely	to	report	about	the	pricing	mechanism	if	it	does	not	increase	its	profits.	To	sum	up,	neither	from	behavioural	theories,	nor	from	recent	empirical	research	is	it	possible	to	predict	exactly	whether	or	not	the	implementation	of	a	PWYW	pricing	mechanism	increases	the	profit	of	a	specific	company.	So	far	only	selected	variables	and	structures	that	influence	revenue	and	profit	have	been	identified.	This	statement	is	also	true	if	reciprocity	as	a	driver	of	decision	is	being	considered.	For	three	decades	now,	reciprocity	turned	into	a	central	topic	in	economics	(Fehr,	Kirchsteiger	and	Riedl	1993;	Berg,	Dickhaut	and	McCabe	1995;	Fehr	and	Gächter	1998;	2000).	The	rise	of	behavioural	economics	provides	evidence	that	many	economists	have	accepted	the	importance	of	other	regarding	preferences—reciprocity	being	one	of	them	(Mercier	Ythier	2006).	However,	reciprocity	and	gift-giving	as	applied	in	behavioural	economics	are	different	from	the	concept	of	the	Gift	introduced	by	Mauss.	Next,	I	sketch	out	the	main	difference.		
Reciprocity,	the	Trust	Game	and	the	Gift	In	this	section	I	firstly	reflect	on	the	concept	of	positive	reciprocity	as	it	is	used	in	behavioural	economics.	Secondly,	a	brief	summary	of	the	core	ideas	of	the	Gift	follows.	Thirdly,	the	most	important	differences	between	both	concepts	are	pointed	out	with	the	trust	game,	as	a	case	in	point.	The	observation	that	people	do	not	behave	selfishly	but	reciprocate	in	many	situations	has	been	integrated	into	economic	theories.	These	are	summarized	as	theories	of	other	regarding	preferences	(Fehr	and	Schmidt	2006).	Fehr	and	Gächter	(1998)	argue	that	many	people	are	not	selfish	but	behave	reciprocally.	They	describe	
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positive	reciprocity	as	“[…]	the	impulse	or	desire	to	be	kind	to	those	who	have	been	kind	to	us.”	(Fehr	and	Gächter	1998:	845;	see	additionally	Albert	et	al.	2007;	Falk	and	Fischbacher	2006;	Fehr	and	Fischbacher	2003).	Remarkable	are	the	results	of	Fehr,	Kirchsteiger	and	Riedl	(1993).	In	an	experiment	they	find	that	a	considerable	number	of	buyers	pay	a	high	price	in	order	to	give	an	incentive	for	sellers	to	provide	a	higher	quality	of	a	good.	On	average,	half	of	the	sellers	in	the	experiment	reacted	with	a	positive	reciprocity,	i.e.	with	a	higher	product	quality	(Fehr,	Kirchsteiger	and	Riedl	1993:	438-9;	also	Fehr,	Kirchsteiger	and	Riedl	1998).	Fehr	and	Gächter	(2000:	160)	argue	that	one	of	the	consequences	of	reciprocity	is	to	enforce	social	norms	in	collective	settings.	Whether	selfish	or	non-selfish	preferences	dominate	within	a	group	of	deciders	is	influenced	by	the	institutional	framework.	Besides	the	abundance	of	experimental	evidence	on	the	ubiquitous	existence	of	positive	reciprocity	in	laboratory	settings	(e.g.,	in	the	trust	game,	and	the	gift-exchange	game),	field	experiments	(Falk	2008)	also	confirm	this	behaviour	and	evolutionary	simulations	show	distributions	of	different	types	of	preferences	within	a	population	over	time	(e.g.,	Bowles	and	Gintis	2004;	Bowles,	Choi	and	Hopfensitz	2003).	Fehr	and	Schmidt	(2006:	618)	describe	the	state	of	research	in	economic	theory	by	outlining	that	it	is	not	a	question	anymore	whether	individuals	have	(apart	from	material	selfishness)	other-regarding	preferences.	The	question	is	rather	about	the	conditions	and	related	social	effects	of	such	preferences.	Such	conditions	and	social	effects	are	addressed	by	Marcel	Mauss.	Mauss’s	(1923/1924)	concept	of	the	Gift	is	rarely	referred	to	in	economics.	According	to	Mauss,	the	individual	decision	is	conditioned	by	both	individual	freedom	and	social	obligations	(Hart	2007:	481).	In	Mauss’s	words	(1990:	70)	an	individual	“[…]	must	act	by	taking	account	of	his	own	interests,	and	those	of	the	society	and	its	subgroups.”	That	is	why	a	person’s	behaviour	has	an	individual	and	a	social	orientation	alike.	The	concept	of	the	Gift	tackles	both.	Mauss’s	system	of	total	services	can	be	understood	as	an	institutional	setting	which	includes	collective	entities,	rules	and	obligations	of	exchange	(Douglas	1990:	5).	Exchange	in	this	system	is	compulsory	and	ubiquitous,	and	can	embrace	nearly	everything.	Douglas	provides	examples	of	exchange,	such	as	banquets,	rituals,	military	services,	and	cultural	activities.	As	collective	entities	which	engage	in	exchange,	Mauss	addresses	families,	clans	and	tribes.	Indeed,	exchange	has	a	strong	competitive	element	if	one	group	or	an	individual	tries	to	outperform	counterparts	in	a	situation	of	repeated	reciprocal	giving.	It	is	important	to	note	that	Mauss’s	writings	allow	a	universal	application	of	the	Gift,	i.e.	the	concept	can	be	applied	to	modern	market	exchange	as	much	as	to	‘archaic	exchange’	(see	Hart	2007	for	the	history	
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of	the	interpretation	of	Mauss)	and	that	the	concept	is	related	to	an	evolutionary	process	(Hann	2006:	208).	Assuming	that	the	Gift	is	a	universal	concept	(Liebersohn	2011:	139-164)	and	captures	many	types	of	exchange	in	modern	states	and	other	organizations,	I	argue	that	it	is	applicable	to	a	large	number	of	social	interactions	today.	Thus,	the	analysis	of	collective	exchange	systems	may	include	team	work,	science,	hierarchies,	or	pricing	systems	and	also	modern	organizations,	such	as	sport	clubs,	bureaucracies,	schools,	or	private	enterprises.	The	reasons	why	I	build	my	argument	on	Mauss,	are,	firstly,	that	he	is	the	first	among	the	prominent	ones	who	develops	a	generalized	view	on	gifts	and	reciprocity	applicable	for	every	society,	and,	secondly,	that	his	theoretical	work	became	the	cornerstone	for	theories	on	reciprocity	in	anthropology,	and	inspired	the	work	of	Polanyi,	Lévi-Strauss,	and	Sahlins.	This	position	does	not	ignore	that	it	is	Malinowski	(1922),	one	of	Mauss’s	central	sources,	who	pointedly	addresses	gifts	and	counter-gifts.	In	his	compact	book,	published	shortly	after	Mauss	(1923/24),	Malinowski	(1926)	most	beautifully	illustrates	the	complexity	of	exchange	and	obligations.	Neither	do	I	ignore	the	critique	on	Mauss,	as	articulated,	for	instance,	by	Parry	(1986),	nor	am	I	unaware	that	other	anthropological	concepts	of	exchange	go	beyond	reciprocity,	such	as	Weiner’s	(1992)	‘keeping-while-giving’.	Nonetheless,	for	the	purpose	of	this	paper	the	reference	to	Mauss	will	suffice.	When	Mauss	(1990,	39-43)	illustrates	the	concept	of	the	Gift,	he	refers	to	potlatch	cultures	from	the	Pacific	and	North	America	and	to	historical	examples	from	Europe	and	Asia.	The	Gift	in	its	original	forms	is	characterized	by	three	immanent	obligations.	The	first	one	is	the	obligation	to	give,	which	is	ubiquitous	and	central	for	groups	or	for	individuals.	Both	have	to	give,	in	order	to	preserve	a	powerful	social	position	through	the	signalling	and	demonstration	of	wealth,	fortune,	being	blessed	by	the	gods	or	spirits,	etc.	This	obligation	goes	hand	in	hand	with	the	compulsory	invitation	of	others,	i.e.	the	spread	of	information	to	all	potential	receivers	of	a	gift-giving	occasion,	for	instance	the	invitation	to	a	feast.	Second,	the	invited	are	obliged	to	accept	the	invitation	and	are	also	obliged	to	accept	a	gift.	A	gift	cannot	be	refused.	Instead,	as	Mauss	writes,	a	burden	is	attached	to	it	and	the	receiver	of	the	gift	has	to	carry	this	burden.	Third,	the	burden	is	expressed	by	the	obligation	to	reciprocate	the	gift	in	the	future.	Indeed,	by	fulfilling	of	the	latter	obligation	a	new	round	of	reciprocal	exchange	is	likely	to	start.	Violations	of	one	of	these	obligations,	e.g.	not	to	invite,	to	decline	an	invitation,	to	reject	a	gift,	or	an	insufficient	reciprocation	of	the	gift,	inevitably	leads	to	social	consequences	for	the	offender	or	her	group.	Examples	are	loss	of	social	esteem,	status,	power,	etc.	As	Mauss	(1990)	shows,	these	patterns	of	exchange	are	universal	even	if	the	radical	form	of	it	–	the	potlatch	–	constitutes	an	exception.	However,	it	is	plausible	to	assume	that	elements	of	this	form	of	gift	exchange	exist	in	contemporary	
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societies,	for	instance	in	customer-firm	relations.	As	a	consequence	thereof,	one	can	ask	whether	the	concept	provides	guidance	for	the	successful	implementation	of	a	participative	pricing	mechanism.	Before	addressing	this	question	in	the	next	section,	I	will	discuss	the	trust	game	(TG)	briefly.	The	TG	is	a	workhorse	in	behavioural	economics	and	illustrates	not	only	the	existence	of	other	regarding	preferences,	but	also	the	way	how	reciprocity	can	be	measured.	It	has	been	used	to	model	PWYW	pricing	as	a	game	tree	(Greiff	and	Egbert	2016b).	The	TG	can	also	be	used	to	illustrate	the	main	difference	between	the	Gift	and	reciprocity	considerations	in	behavioural	economics.		The	TG	is	a	sequential	game	with	two	players.	Both	players	receive	an	endowment	and	the	first	player,	the	sender,	can	pass	any	share	of	her	endowment	to	the	second	player,	the	receiver.	Both	players	know	that	this	share	is	exogenously	multiplied,	for	instance	tripled	by	the	experimenter	before	it	is	passed	to	the	receiver.	Next,	the	receiver	can	return	any	amount	to	the	sender.	The	multiplication	allows	the	receiver	to	reciprocate	the	sender.	However,	she	may	also	return	nothing.	The	sender	is	considered	to	be	a	‘trustor’	who	is	confident	that	the	receiver	–	a	‘trustee’	–	reciprocates	trust.	After	Berg,	Dickhaut	and	McCabe	(1995)	had	introduced	the	experiment,	it	was	tested	in	many	different	settings	(for	a	survey	see	Ortmann,	Fitzgerald	and	Boeing	2000;	for	a	meta-analysis	see	Johnson	and	Mislin	2008).	Results	are	by	and	large	robust,	even	if	regional	differences	are	documented.	The	typical	interpretation	of	the	TG	is	that	the	trustor’s	decision	is	a	signal	of	trust	and	the	trustee’s	decision	(reciprocation)	is	a	signal	of	trustworthiness.	Based	on	this	assumption,	results	about	trustees’	behaviour	can	be	formulated.	About	half	of	the	trustees	betray	the	trustors’	trustworthiness	and	return	(almost)	nothing,	while	the	other	half	of	the	trustees	honour	trust	by	returning	more	than	the	received	amount.	The	decision	to	honour	trust	can	be	motivated	by	positive	reciprocity,	i.e.,	a	propensity	to	reward	friendly	behaviour.	The	TG	resembles	to	a	considerable	degree	a	PWYW	pricing	situation	where	a	seller	offers	a	product	to	a	buyer	and	the	latter	can	reciprocate	the	offer	by	a	payment	(Greiff	and	Egbert	2016b).	If	the	TG	is	compared	with	the	Gift	context,	three	main	differences	are	apparent.	Firstly,	in	the	TG	players	are	mostly	anonymous,	i.e.	they	have	no	identities.	Individual	preferences	with	respect	to	identity	are	absent.	Secondly,	the	trustee	in	the	TG	has	no	exogenously	set	obligation	to	reciprocate	the	sender.	Norms	of	reciprocity	may	be	present,	but	are	not	dictated	by	society.	Thirdly,	TGs	are	often	one	shot	games	and	do	not	simulate	repeated	interaction.	The	Gift	however	implies	long-term	repeated	interaction.	All	three	aspects,	‘identity’,	‘obligation’,	and	‘repeated	interaction’	are	crucial	in	the	Gift	context	and	are	likely	to	enforce	reciprocal	behaviour.	What	we	can	learn	from	the	results	of	TG	is	
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that	even	without	the	three	harsh	institutional	constraints	a	number	of	receivers	behave	reciprocally.			
The	Gift	and	the	Buyer:	PWYW	pricing		This	section	addresses	the	questions	how	the	concept	of	the	Gift	provides	guidance	for	a	successful	application	of	a	PWYW	pricing	mechanism.	Under	PWYW	pricing	a	seller	is	comparable	to	a	gift-giver	or	a	trustor,	and	buyers	are	trustees	who	have	the	option	to	reciprocate.	Next,	four	interrelated	aspects,	which	can	be	considered	as	necessary	preconditions	for	the	application	of	PWYW	pricing,	are	identified	for	such	a	seller-buyer	relation.	Kim,	Natter	and	Spann	(2009)	popularized	PWYW	pricing	as	a	topic	of	scientific	research.	They	emphasize	the	importance	of	personal	interaction	between	a	seller	and	a	buyer.	The	PWYW	contexts	that	they	investigate	are	not	anonymous,	for	instance	PWYW	pricing	in	a	restaurant.	Identity	between	the	two	parties	is	created	through	face-to-face	interaction	(see	also	Hilbert	and	Suessmair	2015).	Indeed,	this	is	very	similar	to	the	Gift	as	illustrated	for	potlatches.	Identity	of	gift-givers	and	gift-receivers	is	a	crucial	factor	in	order	to	make	this	exchange	system	work	(see	the	literature	mentioned	by	Kim,	Natter	and	Spann	2009:	46;	see	additionally	Regner	and	Riener	2012).	Non-anonymity	through	social	interaction	of	the	involved	parties	in	a	PWYW	interaction	can	be	considered	the	first	aspect.	Closely	related	to	non-anonymous	exchange	is	the	visibility	of	the	exchanged	items	and	related	payments.	Information	about	the	size	and	the	value	of	the	exchanged	items	can	be	made	public,	exactly	like	in	a	potlatch.	It	is	in	the	interest	of	the	giver	to	make	the	value	of	her	gift	public.	The	visibility	of	the	exchanged	items	(for	givers,	receivers	but	also	for	bystanders)	is	an	integral	part	of	the	institutional	setting	of	a	potlatch.	The	visibility	of	exchanged	items	enables,	on	the	one	hand,	information	sharing	of	people’s	activities,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	implementation	of	social	norms.	In	a	business	context,	it	is	in	the	interest	of	a	seller	to	make	the	quality	of	her	products	known	to	potential	buyers.	Additionally,	under	PWYW	pricing	it	is	also	in	the	seller’s	interest	to	get	to	know	individual	payments	of	buyers.	Furthermore,	it	may	also	be	in	the	interest	of	the	buyer	to	inform	the	seller	or	other	buyers	about	her	payment.	In	particular,	if	buyers	have	status	and	self-image	concerns,	a	PWYW	mechanism	should	be	constructed	in	such	a	way	that	payments	become	visible.	Visibility	of	buyers’	payments	for	the	seller	and	other	buyers	is	the	second	aspect.	This	goes	hand	in	hand	with	another	feature	pertinent	to	the	Gift.	In	order	to	have	effects	from	the	visibility	of	gift-giving	the	exchange	partners	must	have	a	similar	value	system.	This	value	system	may	refer	(i)	to	the	goods	being	exchanged,	(ii)	to	the	pricing	mechanism	itself,	or	
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(iii)	to	social	norms	of	exchange.	In	economic	terms,	buyers	and	sellers	should	have	similar	preferences	viz.	value	systems.	If	the	value	system	is	related	to	the	product	being	sold	(e.g.,	sport	products,	music	songs	of	a	specific	band),	sellers	and	buyers	may	follow	norms	prevalent	within	the	sports	community	or	within	the	fan	community	of	the	music	band.	Results	of	TG	hint	that	if	information	about	players	is	introduced,	a	positive	effect	on	reciprocal	behaviour	may	occur	(e.g.,	Fershtman	and	Gneezy	2001).	Information	about	individuals	in	a	PWYW	pricing	context	can	be	considered	as	signals	that	specific	value	systems	are	in	place.	Santana	and	Morwitz	(2015)	address	a	similar	aspect	in	PWYW	experiments	and	field	studies.	They	measure	social	value	orientation	with	respect	to	exogenously	implemented	norms	and	find	that	norms	have	effects	on	the	amount	being	paid.	Gravert	(2017)	addresses	similar	structures.	She	tests	PWYW	pricing	for	books	sold	at	a	charitable	bookstore	and	finds	that	buyers	pay	more	for	the	books	when	they	are	reminded	of	having	a	membership	card	of	the	bookstore	(see	also	results	from	Regner	2015).	Mauss	elaborates	on	the	concept	of	the	Gift	by	referring	to	ethnographic	and	historic	examples.	All	groups	and	societies	analyzed	by	Mauss	follow	a	group-specific	internal	value	system.	That	is	why	the	third	aspect	relevant	for	implementing	PWYW	pricing	can	be	summarized	as	a	‘shared	value	system’	of	sellers	and	buyers.	Finally,	the	Gift	is	related	to	repeated	interactions.	Repeated	interaction	allows	the	long-term	enforcement	of	social	norms.	This	is	also	the	case	if	a	seller-buyer	relation	is	not	one	shot	but	resembles	repeated	exchange	with	the	same	individuals.	In	such	a	repeated	interaction,	on	the	one	hand	the	seller	can	lose	her	reputation	if	the	goods	she	offers	are	of	low	quality	which	a	buyer	can	detect	after	purchase.	The	latter	can	negatively	reciprocate	the	low	quality	in	future	purchases	or	abstain	from	buying.	On	the	other	hand,	a	buyer	who	does	not	contribute	adequately	to	the	costs	of	production	in	a	PWYW	setting	is	at	risk	of	receiving	no	products	or	products	of	low	quality	in	the	future.	Thus,	a	situation	of	repeated	interaction	with	the	same	players	is	likely	to	increase	the	quality	of	the	products	offered	as	well	as	the	prices	being	paid	(e.g.,	Mak	et	al.	2015).	PWYW	pricing	is,	hence,	applicable	for	repeated	interaction	with	the	same	buyers.	This	can	be	considered	the	fourth	aspect.	The	above	four	aspects	seem	to	be	essential	preconditions	if	PWYW	pricing	is	not	a	short-term	but	a	long-term	pricing	strategy	for	a	seller,	respectively	a	company.	They	can	be	directly	derived	from	the	Gift.	As	one	can	see,	they	are	largely	overlapping	and	not	independent	from	each	other.		
Conclusion	This	paper	addresses	the	recently	popular	specific	participative	pricing	mechanism	of	Pay-What-You-Want	pricing	for	a	company.	An	intriguing	
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question	is	how	the	mechanism	can	be	applied	in	business	contexts.	In	case	studies,	field	experiments	and	laboratory	experiments	the	influence	of	different	variables	and	settings	on	payments	have	been	tested.	In	contrast	to	these	empirical	studies	this	paper	has	addressed	the	same	question	by	referring	to	Marcel	Mauss’s	concept	of	the	Gift.	Mauss	has	argued	that	individuals	are	individually	and	socially	motivated	and	his	masterpiece,	the	Gift,	shows	similarities	to	topics	discussed	in	behavioural	economics,	for	instance	reciprocal	behaviour.	Nonetheless,	the	Gift	has	not	been	used	to	examine	PWYW	pricing	so	far.	The	application	of	the	Gift	to	PWYW	pricing	shows	that	four	preconditions	appear	to	be	necessary	in	order	to	make	PWYW	pricing	a	successful	long-term	pricing	strategy	that	generates	profits	for	a	seller.	These	have	been	identified	in	this	paper.	They	are	(1)	non-anonymity	of	the	involved	persons,	(2)	visibility	of	buyers’	payments	to	the	seller,	(3)	mutual	value	system,	and	(4)	repeated	interaction	among	the	individuals.	The	analysis	does	not	deny	that	other	factors,	which	have	been	intensively	discussed	and	empirically	tested	in	the	PWYW	literature,	are	less	prominent.	On	the	contrary,	they	are	immensely	significant,	for	instance	reference	prices	of	a	product,	market	structure,	type	of	goods	being	offered,	etc.	However,	only	very	few	applications	of	PWYW	pricing	as	a	long-term	pricing	strategy	have	been	documented	so	far.	The	paper	has	provided	some	insights	into	the	concept	of	the	Gift	as	guidance	to	applications	which	resemble	systems	of	repeated	reciprocity.	This	paper	has	sought	to	apply	the	well	known	concept	to	a	specific	mechanism	in	a	modern	business	context.			
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